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As every English lawyer will tell you, the leading case on necessity as a defense involved two starving castaways, Dudley and
Stephens, who saved their lives by killing the ship's cabin boy and
eating him. If he is a criminal lawyer, he will also be able to tell
you that the defense of necessity failed and Dudley and Stephens
were convicted of murder;' he may also know that the death sentence was commuted to six months' imprisonment. He is unlikely
to be able to tell you any more. Henceforth, however, every criminal lawyer who relishes a rattling good yarn will be able to furnish2
further details because, in Cannibalism and the Common Law,

Professor Simpson has written the definitive account of the incident, which he sets in its place in legal and maritime history.
The behavior of Dudley and Stephens, it seems, was far from
unique. We are nostalgic for sailing ships nowadays, as we are for
windmills, their land relations. The truth about both, unfortunately, is that they were highly dangerous to those who worked on
them. Both were easily wrecked by the wind that powered them,
from which they could not escape if it blew too hard. If a sailing
ship foundered, those it carried usually drowned. If they managed
to take to the boats-assuming there were any boats-they frequently died of hunger and thirst instead. There were no radios to
summon help, no helicopters for search missions, and the chances
of rescue were remote. In these circumstances, the survivo-rs were
often reduced to eating the bodies of those who had died,' and
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there are a number of well-authenticated instances of survivors actually killing one of their number in order to eat him."
Professor Simpson has lovingly assembled a large collection of
these gruesome cases, which he zestfully recounts with no details
spared. It was customary, it seems, for the survivors to draw lots to
decide who was to be eaten-although, as Professor Simpson wryly
points out, the lot usually managed to fall on the weakest, the fattest, or the least popular person in the boat.5 Nautical delicacy further required the survivors to cut their shipmate's head off and
throw it overboard before they began their meal.' Sailors who had
done all this and lived to tell the tale saw no reason not to tell it,
and no attempt was ever made to prosecute them when they did.
The stories were known on land and very well known to seamen,
among whom they circulated in ballad form.7 It was, Professor
Simpson concludes, the custom of the sea: "[M]aritime survival
cannibalism, preceded by the drawing of lots and killing, was a socially''saccepted practice among seamen until the end of the days of
sail.

Originally, if sailors ate one another, nobody cared. For most
of the days of sail, seamen inhabited a harsh and barbarous world
of their own where landsmen left them to their own vices and devices. On the one hand, sailors were often hideously exploited, with
unseaworthy ships, inadequate food, and wages often unpaid. If
the ship sank, no one except the owner wanted to know why-and
not even the owner if it was adequately insured.9 On the other
hand, what sailors did to one another on the high seas was largely
their own business. Except for piracy, nobody much troubled about
crimes on the high seas. It was often quite uncertain which courts
on land had jurisdiction to try ordinary crimes committed at sea,
and in some cases it was even uncertain whether any court had
jurisdiction at all.1°
During the nineteenth century, however, all this began to
change. Public concern about the condition of the poor in factories
generated public concern about the condition of the poor at sea,
and a series of maritime reforms took place. Charitable people set
4

6

See id. at 122-40.
See id. at 124, 131.
See id. at 142.

7 Several of these ballads are recounted by Professor Simpson, id. at 140-44.
s Id. at 145.
o On conditions at sea through the eighteenth century, see id. at 106-10.
10 See id. at 103, 232.
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up lifeboat stations to save sailors from drowning in shipwrecks,1 1

and Parliament passed an endless string of acts to make the
sailor's life better and safer: acts regulating maximum loads, navigation lights, and the rule of the road at sea; acts instituting examinations and licenses for ships' masters and mates; acts providing
for official inquiries into shipwrecks; and acts making it easier for
seamen to claim their wages if unpaid. 12 Alongside this attempt to
civilize conditions of work at sea went a determined attempt to
civilize the sailors themselves. The charitable not only founded
lifeboat stations to save sailors' lives, they founded missions in an
attempt to save their souls as well."8 The Merchant Shipping Act
of 1854 not only provided for fuller and further wreck inquiries; it
also gave the land courts jurisdiction over crimes committed on
British ships on the high seas and committed anywhere by sailors
serving on them. 14 Thus marine cannibalism, although tolerated by
sailors, came within the reach of the common law.
In 1874, when the survivors of the Euxine were landed at Singapore, having told their rescuers how they had killed and eaten
one of their comrades in order to survive, an attempt was made to
prosecute them. The sailors were brought back to England but
were eventually released without trial, partly because the Colonial
Office, the Board of Trade, and the Home Office could not agree on
who should pay the legal costs' 5 and partly because vital evidence
had been lost while the file was shuffled from desk to desk.16 This
debacle seems to have rankled in the Home Office, which determined to get it right next time. Next time was Regina v. Dudley &
Stephens.
In 1883, Thomas Dudley, who had first gone to sea at the age
of nine, was engaged to sail to Australia a yacht called the Mignonette, whose new owner wanted it delivered to him in Sydney.17
Dudley left Southampton with a crew of three: Stephens, Brooks,
,1See id. at 102.
22 These statutory provisions were consolidated in the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, 17
& 18 Vict., ch. 104, §§ 20-29 (measurement of tonnage), §§ 131-140 (examinations and certificates for masters and mates), §§ 170-191 (payment and modes of recovery of wages), § 295
(lights and fog signals), §§ 296-299 (ships meeting and passing), §§ 432-438 (inquiries into
shipwrecks), reprinted in 2 F. MAUDE & C. POLLOCK, A COMPENDImM OF THE LAW OF
MERCHANT SHIPPING at xxiii, xxix-xxxiv, lvii-lix, lxvi-lxx, ci-cii, cxxxi-cxxxii (1881).
I See SIMPSON at 110.
14 Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, 17 & 18 Vict., ch. 104, §§ 267-270, reprinted in 2 F.
MAUDE & C. POLLOCK,supra note 12, at xciii-xciv.
195
See SIMPSON at 190.
16See id. at 192.
17 Professor Simpson tells the story of the voyage, id. at 13-72.
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and a boy called Richard Parker. The yacht was wrecked in a
storm in the South Atlantic, and the four men were cast adrift in
an open boat. Only the heroic efforts of Dudley kept the boat
afloat and maintained in its crew the will to live. After surviving
for nineteen days on two tins of turnips, a little rainwater, and a
turtle, they were all in very bad shape, the weakest being Richard
Parker. At this point, Dudley and Stephens killed him by cutting
his throat. It was a minimal breach of the Sixth Commandment.
Parker was at death's door and was killed primarily because his
shipmates thought it would be impossible to obtain his blood if
they waited for him to die naturally. Having drunk his blood, all
three fed on his body for a further four or five days, at the end of
which they were rescued. The details come from them, but there
seems no reason to doubt their word. All three men were of excellent character. They went straight to the harbor authorities at Falmouth when they landed and told them everything. 18 Had they
wanted to lie, they could have said that Parker had died naturally,
and nobody would have known the truth. They saw nothing wrong
in what they had done and were amazed to be arrested and
charged with murder.1 9 In Falmouth, and in other seaports, people
shared their surprise. The victim's family was very understanding,
the Falmouth magistrates granted the men bail-almost unheard
of in a murder case-and a defense fund that was set up to help
them with their legal costs was filled and oversubscribed.20
It was precisely because of the widespread popular feeling that
what had been done was right and proper that the Home Secretary
and the Government Law Officers decided to prosecute. They
wanted it clearly established, against popular opinion among
2
sailors, that what Dudley and Stephens had done was wrong. ' It
followed that the authorities were anxious not only for a trial, but
also for a conviction at the end of it-although it was clear to all
concerned that the death penalty would have to be remitted in the
end.22 The prosecution presented problems, however. One was securing evidence, which was done by discharging Brooks and calling
him as a witness for the Crown.23 A more serious one was the danger inherent in every prosecution brought as a matter of principle
11 See id. at 4.

'9 See id. at 10.
:0 See id. at 79-86.
21 See id. at 89.
See id. at 92.
3 See id. at 91.
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against a transgressor whom popular opinion favors-that the jury
would rebel and perversely acquit, so turning the intended public
object lesson on its head. 4 Baron Huddleston, the judge who tried
the case at Exeter Assizes, seems to have been as anxious as the
Home Secretary to avoid this and took extreme measures to prevent it. He told the jury-falsely-that they were not at liberty to
acquit Dudley and Stephens and that their choice lay between convicting them of murder and finding a special verdict.2 5 When the
jury, which seems to have been sympathetic to the defendants,
chose the special verdict, he persuaded them to adopt as their findings a statement of the facts that he had earlier prepared.2 6 Thus
they were steamrollered into finding that the men would "probably" have died if they had not eaten Richard Parker, when they
wanted to find that the men would otherwise certainly have died.27
Then, having further touched up their findings in his lodgings after
the trial,2 8 Baron Huddleston referred the question of whether the
findings amounted to guilty or not guilty to his brother judges in
London. The judges-predictably-rejected the defense of necessity, convicted Dudley and Stephens of murder, and sentenced
them to death; 29 the death sentence was later commuted to imprisonment for six months.3 0 On his release Dudley, like many a less
appealing convict, emigrated to Australia where he made his fortune.3 1 Stephens and Brooks retired to obscurity in England, where

they died

32

poor.

Was the case bound to go the way it did, once Dudley and
Stephens were deprived of the chance of jury equity? Professor
Simpson points out that the judges in London were served up a
defense case that was badly presented, in which some powerful arguments were not put at all.13 Some intelligent people then, and
many intelligent people since, have argued that Dudley and Stephens should have succeeded in their defense.3 4 It is certainly possible for a legal system to swallow a defense of necessity to cover a
case like this. In the Norwegian counterpart of Dudley and Ste24 See id. at 199.

See id. at 209, 212.
24 See id. at 213.
15

27 See id. at 214.
18 See id. at 218.
39 See id. at 237.
30 See id. at 247.
31 See id. at 291, 294.
See id. at 288-90.
See id. at 223, 229-34, 239-40.
See GLAWvmL
WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CmRAiNAL LAw 606 (2d ed. 1983).
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phens, which Professor Simpson has unearthed in his researches,
the sailors (by agreement of the king and his cabinet and the other
public officials involved) were not charged. The incident later inspired a section in the Norwegian Penal Code that provides a utilitarian defense of necessity that would have gotten Dudley and Stephens off. 5 In light of the English judges' attitude toward the case
(as shown by Baron Huddleston's conduct of the trial and the tone
of Lord Coleridge's judgment in London), it is hard to believe that
they would have let Dudley and Stephens off, whatever arguments
had been put forward. English judicial attitudes simply precluded
the possibility.
The problem facing Dudley and Stephens was that English
judges seem to have a long-standing love of broadly defined offenses and a deep suspicion of broad defenses. This leads to a very
strict rule of criminal law, tempered only by the judges' liking for
the administrative discretion not to prosecute and by judicial discretion to give a light sentence. These are the real limits of criminal liability. The attitude is ancient, durable, and widespread, and
most judges past and present seem to share it; judges like James
Fitzjames Stephen and Lord Reid, whose writings favor clarity and
precision in the criminal law, are very much the exception. Examples of this paternalistic attitude abound. Thus, eighteenth-century judges happily defined the crimes of seditious and blasphemous libel in the widest terms and were not at all worried that
most of the publications that fell foul of their definitions were not
in practice prosecuted."6 Their treatment of these offenses led to
the intervention of Parliament with Fox's Libel Act of 1792.37
More recently, the courts were called upon to define the limits of
the crime of defamatory libel. In the Wicks case,38 the court said
that it covers any publication that amounts to a civil libel;39 to the
objection that this definition was dangerously wide, the court an15

Almindelig borgerlig Straffelov § 47 (Nwy. 1902), translated in THE

NAL CODE 29 (H. Schjoldager trans. 1961). See SIMPSON at 264-66.
3 William Hone was tried in 1817 for blasphemous libel over

NORWEGIAN

Pz-

some parodies of the
Book of Common Prayer. His defense was that many people, including Luther and Milton,
had parodied sacred works to their purposes and that no one had been prosecuted for publishing these. Said Abbott, J.: "The employment of the style of scripture narrative was in
itself a high offence ... None of these instances could, however, furnish the slightest excuse
to the defendant." THE FIRST TRIL OF WmLuAM HONE 19-35, 47 (anon. London 1817).
37 An Act to remove Doubts respecting the Functions of Juries in Cases of Libel (The
Libel Act), 1792, 32 Geo. 3, ch. 60.
" 25 Crim. App. 168 (1936).
" See id. at 173.
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swered that prosecutors ought not to prosecute in trivial cases.40
Another example is the English judges' taste for offenses of
strict liability. Again and again over the years, the courts have imposed strict liability for statutory offenses. To the argument that
this is unjust, the courts reply that in a hard case the court has
discretion to impose a nominal penalty. They have broadly defined
more serious offenses too. In Sykes v. Director of Public Prosecutions,41 the House of Lords upheld the existence of an offense of
"misprision of felony," consisting of any failure to report a known
felony to the police. To the argument that this made it a crime for
a householder not to report to the police a small boy seen picking
up windfall apples, Lord Goddard said that prosecutors can be relied on to act decently and with common sense.'2 In the Kamara
case, 3 Lord Justice Lawton ruled that an agreement to commit
any civil trespass, however trivial, is a criminal offense, but "as a
matter of practice prosecutions should not be brought unless a
combination of persons to trespass is likely to cause a breach of
44
peace or to affect the public interest."
The same attitude prevails in the law of homicide. Thus, even
in recent years, the English courts have contrived to define both
murder and manslaughter very broadly, in effect pushing each of
them into the category below. In Director of Public Prosecutionsv.
4
Smith 3 and Hyam v. Director of Public Prosecutions,'
the House
of Lords held it to be murder not only where a person kills by acts
intended to kill or cause serious injury, but also where he causes
death by deliberately exposing another to a serious risk. Thus,
shooting or driving at someone to scare him is put on the same
footing as shooting or driving at someone to kill or maim, and murder covers most of what is in practice usually charged as manslaughter only. And in Regina v. Seymour,' the House of Lords
said that manslaughter included not only killing by deliberate exposure to a known risk of harm, but also killing by exposure to an
obvious risk of which the defendant is actually unaware. 4 Thus,
manslaughter covers much of what is usually treated as accidental
See id. at 172.
1962 A.C. 528.
42 See id. at 569.
" Regina v. Kamara, [1973] 1 Q.B. 660 (C.A.).
40

41

44 Id. at 668.
45 1961 A.C. 290.
4s 1975 A.C. 55.
47 1983 A.C. 493.
48 See id. at 503, 506.
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death. Lest this seem overly severe, the House of Lords added that
a manslaughter prosecution ought only to be brought in a "very
grave case ' 49 and reminded us that the defendant's failure to foresee harm was a factor affecting sentence.50
The English judicial attitude toward defenses is, in the main,
the converse of that shown by the House of Lords in Seymour.
Thus, in Buckoke v. Greater London Council,51 the Court of Ap-

peal told us that the driver of a fire engine who ran the traffic
lights to save someone's life in a fire deserved to be congratulated,
but that if he were prosecuted the law gave him no defense!5 2 Lord
Denning recognized the irony of this but noted that the discretion
not to prosecute "a technical breach of the law in which it would
be unjust to inflict any punishment" was available "to mitigate the
strict rigour of the law."53 Given the English tradition of laying
down rules that, in the usual case, no one is really expected to
comply with or seriously expected to be prosecuted for breaking,
Dudley and Stephens were bound to fail; once the government decided to prosecute, nothing that could be said on their behalf
would prevent their conviction.
For this book Professor Simpson deserves the highest praise.
Not only is it scholarly and thought-provoking, it is a very good
read as well. The whole conception of such a book is highly original. In these days of ever greater specialization the author has
written a book on a major legal topic-the defense of necessity,
with particular reference to murder-that is easily accessible to the
general reader. He has truly succeeded. The book can be read with
equal profit and pleasure by lawyer and layman alike. I doubt that
a more civilized book has ever been written about a more gruesome
topic.
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